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THE R2P IS DEAD. LONG LIVE THE R2P. 
LIBYA, SYRIA, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT  
by Nadir Dalal 
INTRODUCTION 
 The various historic events surrounding the Arab Spring have captured the world’s 
attention. The reactions and responses by the international community have also done so, 
especially the use of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya, in early 
2012.1 That event marked the first time the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had 
ever authorized the unwelcome use of military force against the will of a sovereign state. 
However, given the similarities between the events in Libya and those currently taking 
place in Syria, it is unclear why the UNSC has not used R2P for a second time. This paper 
posits that after only a single instance of justifying the use of force against the will of a 
sovereign state, R2P has already been crippled.2 This belief is strengthened by the 
subsequent lack of the use of R2P in Syria, where the humanitarian crisis and need for 
international action is much more dire. The perceived failure of R2P also speaks to the 
failure of the United Nations (UN), and in particular the UNSC, in fulfilling its duty as the 
primary international body tasked with maintaining international peace and security. The 
paper argues that future usage of R2P, or the lack thereof, during the Arab Spring will have 
long lasting effects on the reputation, legitimacy, and future viability of the United Nations 
                                                        
1 R2P creates a responsibility to states to act to prevent or remedy specific humanitarian crises. 
Groundbreaking, R2P even allows for military actions against unwilling sovereign states, given specific 
conditions are satisfied. See generally The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing 
the responsibility to protect, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 
(Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter SG Report] (outlining the core principles, uses, and rationale behind R2P). 
2 Arguments exist that R2P had been used before Libya. However, Libya remains the first and only time when 
the UNSC authorized a military intervention against an unwilling sovereign government, under the third 
pillar of R2P.  
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system. Finally, this paper will also address the means by which R2P may be rehabilitated. 
Given the important purpose for which R2P was created, the international community 
should act purposefully in resuscitating one of its newest, and most important, doctrines. 
 In addressing the statements above, this paper will first detail the history of the 
creation of R2P, including the events that triggered its creation, and the reasoning behind 
its development as a recognized doctrine of international law and diplomacy and its rules 
and functions. Next, careful analyses of data sources will highlight and compare the 
differences and similarities between the use of R2P in Libya and its subsequent lack of use 
in Syria. The paper will then address the impact of the Arab Spring and the use, or nonuse, 
of R2P on the UN. Finally, I will analyze the future outlook for R2P and the means by which 
it may be changed in order to guarantee its future viability. 
HISTORY OF INACTION DURING TIMES OF HUMANITARIAN CRISES  
The goal of the UN Charter (the Charter) is to prevent the outbreak of another World 
War and to institute a system to control the use of force in instances other than self-
defense.3 Within the Charter are several articles that enshrine the internationally 
recognized concept of state sovereignty, a core tenet of the international legal system.4  
State sovereignty is the internationally recognized concept that justifies and protects the 
actions of a state within its own territory.5 Any such actions fall within a state’s due rights 
                                                        
3 See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: “The Old Order Changeth,” 85 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 63, 63 (1991). See also John C. Yoo & Eric Posner, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 7 1, 6 (2006), available at http://works.bepress.com/johnyoo/36. 
4 See Treaty of Westphalia, Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271, available at http://fletcher.archive.tusm-
oit.org/multilaterals/texts/historical/westphalia.txt (regarded as the beginning of the current system of 
equal, sovereign, independent states); U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (“The Organization is based on the principle of 
sovereign equality of all its Members.”). 
5 Black’s Law Dictionary 674 (3rd pocket ed. 2001) (supreme authority exercised and the right to self-
governance) 
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and cannot and should not be interfered with by foreign entities.6 A byproduct of 
protecting state sovereignty has been the domestic or internal perpetration of nearly 50 
mass murders and genocides since 1955, with between 12 and 22 million non-combatant 
casualties.7  These acts continue to happen in direct contravention of the core purposes of 
the UN.8 In part due to the reoccurring nature of these events, the international community 
has worked hard at finding an appropriate and effective solution. To better understand the 
impetus for change, it is important to first briefly review examples of major humanitarian 
crises, and the subsequent international responses, in Bosnia, Rwanda, and East Timor, in 
the years leading up to the creation of R2P.  
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Like many humanitarian crises, the events that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Bosnia) from 1992 to 1995 were deeply rooted in ethnic and cultural tensions. Located in 
a historically multi-ethnic and multi-cultural region of the world, the Bosnian population at 
the time was mainly composed of three main groups: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croatians.9 
Tensions were already high when Bosnia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, 
                                                        
6 Id. (supreme authority implies having the final word and being unquestioned) 
7 Barbara Harff, No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder 
since 1955, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57, 57 (2003). 
8 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml ([T]o 
take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, suppression of acts of 
aggression and other breaches of the peace….”); Id., para. 3 (To achieve international cooperation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.”). 
9 Fran Markowitz, Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo, 49 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 40, 42 (2007) (Ethnic 
distribution in Bosnia: 43.5% Bosniak (Muslim), 31.2% Serbian (Eastern Orthodox), 17.4% Croatian 
(Catholic) (citing National Census, (1991) (Bos’n & Herz.).)). 
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a move that greatly upset the Serb population. By 1995, the death toll from the ensuing 
violence is estimated to be over 250,000 people.10 
 
While casualties are the inevitable result of conflict, it is speculated that the 
response to Serb actions by the UN actually fueled higher levels of violence.11 UN 
involvement in Bosnia was strictly limited to humanitarian relief efforts, including the 
establishment of several ‘safe zones’, which included the village of Srebrenica. Knowing 
that the UN forces would not interfere, in July of 1995 Bosnian-Serb forces attacked 
Srebrenica, a UNSC declared “safe area.”12 Over 30,000 Bosniak Muslims had taken shelter 
in the city, which was under the protection of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops.13 
Serbian forces sent an ultimatum to UNPROFOR troops to either cease interference or 
become targets themselves.14 Following UNPROFOR directive 2/95, UNPROFOR forces 
withdrew from Srebrenica, leaving the city defenseless.15 As Serb forces took control of the 
area, over 7,000 Bosniak males were purposely separated from their families and 
executed.16 Peace came to the region only after US led NATO military air forces took 
                                                        
10 U.N. Dev. Program [UNDP], UNDP Office in Bos’n & Herz., 2002 Human Development Report: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, at 111-112, available at hdr.undp.org/en/.../Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_2002_en.pdf (of the 
estimated 269,810 killed, 157,313 (58.3%) were Bosniak/Muslims). See also Carl Dahlman & Gerard Toal, 
Broken Bosnia: The Localized Geopolitics of Displacement and Return in Two Bosnian Places, 95 Annals Ass’n 
Am. Geographers 644, 644 (2005). 
11 Ivo H. Daalder, Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended, Brookings, Dec. 1998, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/12/balkans-daalder. 
12 S.C. Res. 819, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993), available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm (“Demands that all parties and others concerned treat 
Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other 
hostile act.”). 
13 See Arne Johan Vetlesen, Genocide: A Case for the Responsibility of the Bystander, 37 J. PEACE RES. 519, 530 
(2000) (“The execution of the mandate is secondary to the security of UN personnel….”). 
14 Id. at 531. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
 5 
decisive action, bombing over 300 Serb targets from August to September of 1995.17 The 
added pressure from these strikes combined with diplomatic efforts, helped force Bosnian-
Serb leaders to agree to the Dayton Accords in late 1995.18 Opposite its own purposes, UN 
inaction in Bosnia cost civilian lives and likely prolonged the conflict. During the same time 
period as the Bosnian War, the UN’s failure to act in Rwanda was once more costing 
thousands of lives. 
Rwanda 
Similar to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the population of Rwanda has 
historically been composed of two ethnic groups: the Hutu majority and the Tutsi 
minority.19 A former colony of Belgium, the minority Tutsi had been favored over the Hutu 
by their Belgian rulers.20 This classic colonial era tactic of dividing a population along 
ethnic lines and promoting minority rule helped sow the seeds for future conflict.21 
By the time Rwanda gained independence in 1962, there had already been several 
instances of conflict between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, with Hutus firmly in control by 
the mid-1980s.22 In 1990, a force comprised mainly of Tutsi exiles invaded Rwanda. After 
several years of conflict, a system of power sharing between the two groups was negotiated 
in the summer of 1993. However, when Hutu leader Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane was shot 
                                                        
17  Ryan C. Hendrickson, Crossing the Rubicon, NATO REVIEW, Sept. 1, 2005, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/Combating-Terrorism/Crossing-Rubicon/EN/index.htm. See also 
Kent J. Kille & Ryan C. Hendrickson, NATO and the United Nations: Debates and Trends in Institutional 
Coordination, 2 J. INT’L ORG. STUD. 28, 40 (2011). 
18 Hendrickson, supra note 17. 
19 See William B. Wood, Geographic Aspects of Genocide: A Comparison of Bosnia and Rwanda, 26 Transactions 
Inst. Brit. Geographers 57, 60 (2001) (Tutsis comprise less than 20% of general population). 
20 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 100-
101 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) (2001); See also Kenneth R. White, Scourge of Racism: Genocide in Rwanda, 
39 J. Black Stud. 471, 473-474 (2009). 
21 MAMDANI, supra note 20, at 100-101. 
22 Wood, supra note 19, at 60; White, supra note 20, at 476. 
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down in April 1994 Hutu’s throughout Rwanda reacted with immediate violence against 
the Tutsi population, blaming them for their leader’s death.23 
 Within three months, the death toll reached an estimated 800,000 people with an 
additional two million refugees.24 Despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission in 
Rwanda up to and including the time of the start of violence, the international community 
did little during the three months of violence.25 Even a vote by the UNSC to increase troops 
by 5,500 in May did nothing, as it took six months for Member States to provide the 
necessary troops.26 In the end, it was Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) troops composed of 
mainly Tutsi refugees that succeeded in ousting the standing Hutu government.27 Once 
again the UNSC failed to uphold its duty as the primary body tasked with maintaining 
international peace and security. Nonetheless, the lessons learned in Bosnia and Rwanda 
guided the UN’s subsequent response in East Timor.  
East Timor 
 Ever since Portugal officially left this former colony in 1975, East Timor has had a 
long and violent history with neighboring Indonesia. Conflicts between the two included 
forced annexation and decades of guerilla-type warfare by East Timor separatists. 
Following a change of Indonesian leadership in 1998, the UN Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) was established to conduct a referendum to determine if the East Timorese 
                                                        
23 Wood, supra note 19, at 60; White, supra note 20, at 476-477. 
24 U.N. International Children’s Emergency Fund [UNICEF], Rwanda: Ten years after the genocide, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda_genocide.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
25 S.C. Res. 893, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (Oct. 5, 1993), available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm.  
26 S.C. Res. 918, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994), available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm; See also U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda [UNAMIR], 
Rwanda: UNAMIR Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
27 Wood, supra note 19, at 60. 
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people desired independence from Indonesia.28 Held on August 30, 1999, the referendum 
results clearly indicated the desire for an independent state of East Timor.29 Within days, 
pro-integration militias, with suspected support from Indonesian security forces, launched 
well-orchestrated attacks that killed between two and three thousand people, and 
devastated the East Timor economy and infrastructure.30 
 Unlike in Bosnia and Rwanda, the UN response was swift, with the UNSC soon 
approving the creation and deployment of the International Force for East Timor 
(INTERFET).31 UN control and administration of East Timor continued under the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), until East Timor officially gained 
independence in 2002.32 UN involvement in East Timor would continue under various 
missions for an additional decade.33 This level of foreign involvement in actions of a 
sovereign government perhaps foreshadowed the next steps that the international 
community took to combat future humanitarian crises. 
Lessons Learned 
 While the UN and the international community have almost always attempted to 
remedy major humanitarian crises, their efforts are often too little, too late. With over one 
                                                        
28 S.C. Res. 1246, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1246 (June 11, 1999), available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm.  
29 U.N. Mission in East Timor [UNAMET], East Timor: UNAMET Background, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (95% 
of registered voters cast ballots (total 446,953 votes), with 78.5% voting for independence. 21.5% were in 
favor of the Indonesian proposal for East Timor to become a ‘special autonomous region’ of Indonesia). 
30 Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timore-Leste [CAVR], Chega! The Report of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste Executive Summary, pt. 6, at 3 (2005), 
available at http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/chegaFiles/finalReportEng/06-Profile-of-Violations.pdf.  
31 S.C. Res. 1264, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999), available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm.  
32 S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999), available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm.  
33 S.C. Res. 1410, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (May. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm; S.C. Res. 1599, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1599 (Apr. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2005.shtml.  
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million deaths combined in these examples alone, many thousands could have likely been 
saved with timely and effective UN action. However, the timeline shows an increasing 
comfort of the UN to involve itself in issues that would have historically constituted 
breaches of sovereignty: From apparent paralysis in Bosnia and Rwanda, to swift and 
decisive action in East Timor. Above and beyond merely stopping the violence, the UN also 
established extensive government and administrative support, as was seen in East Timor. 
The next several years following these crises brought about a bold and hopeful solution to 
the problem of massive domestically driven humanitarian crises. 
CREATION, FUNCTION AND RULES OF R2P 
Creation 
The degree of international support and rapid processes of conceptualization, 
refinement, affirmation and implementation of the doctrine of R2P has been 
unprecedented.34 The international community needed a response to the long and bloody 
history of inaction during humanitarian crises. To address this issue, the Canadian 
government created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) in 2000. The ICISS began work on the creation of what would become R2P. It 
published its report, “The Responsibility to Protect,” in 2001.35 The report addressed the 
politically charged issue of state sovereignty, by framing the discussion as a responsibility.36 
                                                        
34 Martha Hall Findlay, Can R2P Survive Libya and Syria? 4-6 (2011), available at 
http://www.opencanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/SSWG-Paper-Martha-Hall-Findlay-November-
2011.pdf (entire process completed less than a decade). 
35 See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (Setting forth the 
preliminary concepts of R2P). 
36 R2P advocates argued that sovereignty comes from the creation of a social contract with the population 
that agrees to be ruled by the sovereign. In return, the primary duty of the sovereign is the protection of the 
people. If the sovereign will not protect the people, it therefore fails to uphold the main duty that grants it 
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Although not fully accepted by the international community in its original form, the ICISS 
report sparked discussions and began a process of refinement that culminated in decisive 
and unified action within the next several years.[footnote] 
 At the 2005 World Summit, heads of state and leaders from around the world came 
to an agreement on a refined form of the R2P doctrine set forth in the 2001 ICISS report.37 
The refined outcome document narrowed the scope and implementation procedures of 
R2P and established the central premise of R2P.38 A month later, the UNSC also reaffirmed 
the World Summit Outcome Declaration.39  
Function 
The final R2P was considerably narrower in scope and function than what was 
originally suggested in the 2001 ICISS report.40 The ICISS report was highly aspirational 
and included controversial elements and suggestions as to how the new doctrine could be 
executed. The original concept of R2P was not restricted to specific crimes and was 
actionable whenever there was a massive humanitarian crisis.41 For forceful interventions, 
a scenario would have had to fulfill six key requirements.42 R2P as conceptualized in the 
ICISS report was far too broad for immediate acceptance. 
In an effort to push R2P forward and make it more palatable for states, the triggers 
and specific purposes for which the doctrine could be used were greatly narrowed. Instead 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
sovereignty. See Ruxandra Ivan, The Responsibility to Protect Whom? The Notion of “Responsibility to Protect” 
in International Politics, 12 ROM. POL. SCI. REV. 309, 310-311 (2012). 
37 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138-139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021752.pdf.  
38 G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 37, ¶ 138-139. 
39 S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1674 (Apr. 26, 2006) available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674(2006) (reaffirming ¶ 138-139 of World 
Summit Outcome Document). 
40 See Findlay, supra note 34, at 5. 
41 See ICISS, supra note 35, at 32-33. 
42 Id. at 32. 
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of a system that could be used flexibly, the use of R2P was reduced to the specific crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.43 The use of R2P was 
also restricted to only cover acts by a state within its own territory. This was done to 
reinforce the idea that R2P enhances state sovereignty by helping states achieve their 
primary responsibilities to their citizens.44  
Rules 
 The formal process by which R2P can activated was also further clarified. This 
process was laid out as “three pillars” as described by UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon 
in 2009.45 For international intervention in the sovereign acts of a state within its own 
territory, including possible use of force, a given situation must in some way fulfill one of 
the three pillars. The first pillar firmly establishes that states have a responsibility to 
protect their own population from the specific triggering crimes of genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.46 The second pillar of R2P extends the 
responsibility of states to include a duty to assist other states in fulfilling the obligations of 
the first pillar.47 If the requirements of the first and second pillar are insufficient for the 
needs of a given situation, the third pillar of R2P allows for quick responses and the use of 
                                                        
43 SG Report, supra note 1, ¶ 10. But see ICISS, supra note 35, at 32 (“[F]or [intervention] to be warranted, 
there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur.”).  
44 SG Report, supra note 1, ¶ 10(a). 
45 See generally SG Report, supra note 1.  
46 SG Report, supra note 1, at pt. I. 
47 SG Report, supra note 1, at pt. II. 
 11 
more coercive options – up to and including the use of force.48
 
Although the third pillar allows for a variety of actions to be taken, most actions, and 
especially any use of force, must first gain approval from the UNSC.49 Alternatives to the 
use of force can include international sanctions regimes as well as referral to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).50 Any use of international force, however, falls under 
the specific powers granted to the UNSC, as the primary international body tasked with the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and thus requires explicit permission.51  
Although in line with the rules of the Charter, this approval requirement coupled 
with the increasing inability for the UNSC to come to agreement on major issues, may hold 
severe implications for the future viability of R2P, as well as the reputation of the UN as the 
main institution in the maintenance of international peace and stability. These concerns are 
justified by the UN’s failure to protect civilian lives during times of crisis, even in the 
immediate period after the creation of R2P. The Darfur region of Sudan has seen conflict 
between rebel groups and Sudanese government forces for over a decade.52 Despite 
                                                        
48 SG Report, supra note 1, at pt. III. 
49 SG Report, supra note 1, ¶ 11(c). 
50 SG Report, supra note 1, ¶ 53-54. 
51 U.N. Charter, supra note 8, art. 24; Id. at Ch. 7. 
52 Glenys Kinnock & Michael E. Capuano, A decade on, Sudan threatens to repeat the tragedy of Darfur, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Mar. 10, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/mar/10/decade-on-sudan-
tragedy-darfur.  
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
Pillar 1 
States have a duty to 
protect their own citizens. 
Pillar 2 
The international 
community has a duty to 
assist states.  
Pillar 3 
Possible use of force if 
authorized by the UNSC. 
 12 
powerful groups calling the events in Darfur, genocide, the UNSC declined to act against the 
wishes of the Sudanese government and to authorize forceful international intervention.53  
Darfur 
 Since gaining independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan has mainly been ruled by 
military regimes.54 The Sudanese government had been in a state of civil war with rebel 
groups in the southern region of Sudan since 1983.55 In 2003, rebel forces in Darfur, 
located in western Sudan, combined forces and attacked government installations.56 With 
most government troops already fighting rebels in the south, the Sudanese government lost 
effective control of rural areas of northern Sudan.57 Exploiting tribal tensions, the Sudanese 
government recruited nomadic tribal groups to aid in fighting the rebels in Darfur.58 Called 
the janjaweed by civilians, these nomadic ad hoc government forces utilized brutal tactics 
that included indiscriminate slaughter, looting, and rape.59  
                                                        
53 See Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 10, 2004, 
at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html (U.S. Secretary 
of State Colin Powell address to Senate Foreign Relations Committee.); Peter Walker & James Sturcke, Darfur 
genocide charges for Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, July 14, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/14/sudan.warcrimes1; Text of President Bush’s Speech on 
Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/africa/29iht-29sudan-
text.5919156.html?_r=0 (“My administration has called these actions by their rightful name: genocide. The 
world has a responsibility to help put an end to it.). 
54 International Commission on Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
to the United Nations Secretary-General, ¶ 43, submitted to the Secretary-General, (Jan. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf [hereinafter Commission on Darfur] (from 1956-
2005, only 10 years of democracy).  
55 Civil War existed between North and South Sudan from 1983 to 2005 with serious human rights abuses 
throughout. Over 2 million died and 4.5 million were displaced from their homes. The conflict in Darfur began 
during this period of peace negotiations. It has been argued that this is because rebel groups in Darfur were 
specifically barred from participating in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) talks. See Commission on 
Darfur, supra note 54, ¶ 50.  
56 Commission on Darfur, supra note 54, ¶¶ 63-66. 
57 Commission on Darfur, supra note 54, ¶ 66. 
58 Commission on Darfur, supra note 54, ¶¶ 67-68. 
59 Janjaweed is an Arabic colloquialism that means approximately “devil on horseback.” These forces, are 
reported to liberally use a ‘scorched earth’ approach to warfare, utilizing tactics such as rape, murder, looting, 
and pillaging. See Commission on Darfur, supra note 54, ¶¶ 98-116. 
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 The actions of the government forces in Darfur fall under the specific crimes 
necessary to trigger R2P consideration. In 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, in the decision Prosecutor v. Akayesu, established that the use of rape as a wartime 
tactic may qualify as an act of genocide.60 Sources confirm that the instances of rape in 
Darfur met the same criteria as was used by the ICTR.61 Next, given that the conflict in 
Darfur was purely an internal affair, the conflict should have also fulfilled the R2P 
requirement that the issue be related to the actions of a state within its own territory.62 
 The fact that the Sudanese government was in control of janjaweed forces 
responsible for killings and rapes denotes a failure to uphold the first pillar of R2P – the 
responsibility to protect one’s own population. Despite the fact that failure to uphold the 
first pillar places the responsibility upon the international community, the international 
response to the conflict was weak.63 An attempt by the UNSC to authorize a peacekeeping 
force via Resolution 1706 in 2006 failed due to lack of consent by the Sudanese 
government; the first ever complete failure of a UNSC authorized peacekeeping mission.64 A 
later peacekeeping mission in 2008 was understaffed, severely behind schedule, and failed 
                                                        
60 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998), available at 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement%5Cakay001.pdf (“[T]he 
Chamber wishes to underscore the fact that in its opinion, [rape and sexual violence] constitute genocide in 
the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a particular group, targeted as such.”). 
61 See Nora Boustany, Janjaweed Using Rape as ‘Integral’ Weapon in Darfur, Air Group Says, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, July 3, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/02/AR2007070201627.html; Testimonies of Rape in Sudan, BBC.CO.UK, July 19, 
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3900777.stm.  
62 See Commission on Darfur, supra note 54, ¶¶ 50, 63-68. 
63 There were 19 UNSC resolutions on Darfur between 2003 and 2008, with no strong response or UN 
established peacekeeping force despite two resolutions authorizing such forces. See S.C. Res. 1706, ¶¶ 1, 3, 8-
9, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1706(2006); S.C. Res. 1769, ¶¶ 1, 5, 15, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007) available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769(2007).  
64 See Africa Action, Six Months Since 1769 (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.africaaction.org/six-months-since-
1769.html (overview of Sudanese conflict from 2003 to 2008). 
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to maintain peace and security in the region.65 Given the numerous peacekeeping failures, 
the duration and severity of the conflict, it remains a mystery why the use of force via R2P 
was never fully put into action in Darfur. It would take several more years and a series of 
revolutions in the Middle East for the UN to finally see the full use of international force 
under R2P in Libya.66 
THE “ARAB SPRING” AND R2P 
 From 2010 to the present, the series of protests, movements, and political 
revolutions termed the “Arab Spring” have rapidly spread across the Middle East and North 
Africa. Starting with Tunisian protests in December 2010, over a dozen states have felt the 
direct impact of the Arab Spring. Although this paper will mainly concentrate on the 
impacts of Arab Spring events in Libya and Syria, it is important to establish a brief timeline 
to illustrate the speed and power with which the Arab Spring came to be. 
Timeline 
The beginnings of the Arab Spring have been traced to the self-immolation of 
Mohammad Bouazizi, a young fruit and vegetable vendor in the relatively stable North 
African state of Tunisia on December 19th, 2011.67 Over the next several days as word of 
Mr. Bouazizi’s actions spread, as well as speculations as to his reasons, groups of youth 
around the country began to gather in protest. In a country, and region, where dissent is 
often times repressed, the ensuing weeks of protest were alarming to all states in the 
region. Within weeks after the first protests in Tunisia, youth in Algeria also began to 
                                                        
65 Id. (U.N. peacekeepers attacked and killed, humanitarian aid workers attacked, conflict continues as 
before). 
66 S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973(Mar. 17, 2011) available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011).  
67 See Garry Blight et al., Arab Spring: An Interactive Timeline of Middle East Protests, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Jan. 5, 
2012, www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline 
(timeline links to news stories collected from Dec. 2010 – Dec. 2011, organized by state and type of action). 
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protest, with a man also setting himself on fire.68 On January 14th, less than a month after 
the initial protests, Tunisian President Ben Ali fled Tunisia after nearly a quarter century of 
rule.69 
The rapid regime change in Tunisia fueled protests throughout the region, and 
within days sparked protests in Egypt.70 These protests in turn sparked even more protests 
throughout the Middle East. A mere eighteen days after protests began in Egypt, President 
Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 11th.71 With two leaders stepping down within a 
month, the Arab Spring had truly become a regional force for change. On February 16th, 
protests spread to neighboring Libya, where long time leader Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi 
began his eight-month struggle to maintain control.72 This marked the first time in history 
that the UN had implemented the use of force against a sovereign and unwilling member of 
the international community.73  
LIBYA, THE FIRST AND LAST USE OF R2P? 
The revolutionary rebellion in Libya stood as a key turning point for the legitimacy 
of the UN and international community in matters where a humanitarian crisis was either 
ongoing or inevitable.  Unable to afford another instance of unilateral action, such as when 
NATO acted without approval in Kosovo, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, on March 18th, 
                                                        
68 See id. at Algeria Jan. 9-13, 2011. 
69 See Angelique Chrisafis & Ian Black, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced to Flee Tunisia as Protestors Claim Victory, 
The GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-
president-flees-country-protests.  
70 See Mohammad Al-Momani, The Arab “Youth Quake”: Implications on Democratization and Stability, 3 
MIDDLE E. L. & GOVERNANCE 159, 160 (2011); Egypt: Thousands Protest Against President Hosni Mubarak, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/jan/25/egypt-protest-
president-murabak-video (protesters comment on inspiration from Tunisian protests). 
71 Chris McGreal & Jack Shenker, Hosni Mubarak Resigns – and Egypt Celebrates a New Dawn, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, 
Feb. 11, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo.  
72 Blight et al., supra note 67, at Libya Feb. 16-Oct. 23, 2011. 
73 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 66; See also Ivan, supra note 36, at 315.  
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2011.74 Under Resolution 1973, the UNSC authorized the use of force against a sovereign 
state for the purposes of humanitarian intervention for the very first time.75  
UNSC Resolution 1973 
In February 2011, the UNSC demanded the immediate end to violent government 
actions against protesters in Libya.76 Qaddafi raised the legitimate fear of massive civilian 
casualties through his speeches to his supporters.77 Given the combination of overt threats, 
history of violence, and mounting evidence of purposeful targeting of civilians, the UNSC 
had little choice but to act immediately to prevent what was seen as an inevitable 
humanitarian crisis.78 UNSC Resolution 1973 was remarkable for several reasons beyond 
being the first authorization for the use of force. First, it marked a clear departure away 
from prior UNSC inaction in the face of looming humanitarian suffering.79 Second, it 
contained very little detail as to exactly how any intervention efforts were to be carried 
                                                        
74 In the spring of 1999, NATO Member States authorized air strikes against Serb forces during the conflict in 
Kosovo. These strikes were carried out despite a recent repeated vetoes by Russia and China on measures 
within the UNSC proposing a similar UNSC sanctioned course of action. This was a major blow to UN 
legitimacy, as the act was not only carried out against explicit votes against such action, but because the 
strikes were ultimately successful in hastening an end to the conflict. See Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian 
War’ over Kosovo, 41 INT’L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUD. 102, 102, 104 (providing background on the NATO action 
and history of vetoes in UNSC); Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
319, 323 (2012) (discussing how unilateral action damaged UNSC legitimacy); See also Findlay, supra note 34, 
at 4. 
75 Contrary to some beliefs, Libya was the first instance of UNSC authorization of military intervention against 
an unwilling sovereign government. Other instances of UN foreign involvement have all included some type of 
permission or request by the host state. See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 66; Paul D. Williams & Alex J. Bellamy, 
Principles, Politics, and Prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Use of Military Force, 38 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 273, 275 (2012). 
76 S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 1, 4, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011) (also imposed targeted travel 
bans, an arms embargo, and referral of the issue of human rights violations to the International Criminal 
Court) 
77 See Sari Bernstein, The Responsibility to Protect after Libya: Humanitarian Intervention as Customary 
International Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 305, 337 (2012); Ved P. Nanda, From Paralysis in Rwanda to Bold Moves 
in Libya, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 39 (2012). 
78 Williams, supra note 75, at 288. 
79 Mohamed, supra note 74, at 331. 
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out.80 For example, the text of Resolution 1973 called for the enforcement of a no-fly zone, 
and authorized UN Member States to take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, 
while expressly forbidding foreign troops to set foot on Libyan territory.81 Notably, support 
for the initiative by the Arab League is largely credited with swaying the opinion of Russia 
and China, who abstained from voting rather than oppose the resolution.82 While this is 
widely regarded as authorizing the use of force, the resolution does not in any way further 
clarify how Member States were specifically to act. Third, it formally acknowledged the 
need for forceful intervention on humanitarian grounds by the international community.83 
The lack of clarity in the resolution left the door open for potential abuse of the R2P 
justifications for intervention and overreach of the express mandate provided in Resolution 
1973.84 For example, some argue that efforts to institute regime change were a necessary 
part of efforts to protect the civilian population. American, British, and French leaders used 
these arguments in justifying their support for subsequent NATO bombings and sorties that 
were not directly related to civilian protection efforts.85 While the resolution did not 
authorize such actions, it also did not expressly forbid regime change efforts.86 Some have 
even claimed that UNSC members violated what meager specificity was set forth in the 
                                                        
80 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 66. 
81 “All necessary measures” did not include the ability to violate the arms embargo established in Res. 1970. 
Regardless, weapons and supplies were routinely supplied to rebel forces. See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 66 
(“[A]ll necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970.”). 
82 See Maysa Bydoon, The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and Libya, 30 EUR. J. SOC. SCI. 377, 379 (2012); See 
also Bernstein, supra note 77, at 338. 
83 See Mohamed, supra note 74, at 331. 
84 Nanda, supra note 77, at 49-50. 
85 Startling opinion piece that outright calls for the elimination of Qaddafi less than a month after the passage 
of Resolution 1973 that justifies such action as a means of guaranteeing civilian protections. Barack Obama et 
al., Libya’s Pathway to Peace, THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 2011, op-ed, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html.  
86 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 66 (no reference to regime change in entire Resolution). 
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resolutions during their own intervention efforts.87 By providing arms and supplies to 
rebels, France and other Member States were seen by some as violating the arms embargo 
laid out in Resolution 1970.88 Additionally, the presence of Special Forces troops in Libya 
violated one of the few explicit commands in Resolution 1973 to avoid any foreign troops 
on Libyan territory.89 NATO air strikes also continued after rebel forces had established 
control in the capital, Tripoli, a fact that strikes against the argument that protecting 
civilians was the primary goal.90 
Overreach of UNSC resolutions held the possibility of setting a dangerous precedent, 
especially in matters related to the violent breach of state sovereignty. China and Russia in 
particular have historically been protective of state sovereignty, and arguably would not 
have supported such action in Libya if not for the extreme circumstances and support of 
regional organizations like the African Union and League of Arab States.91 Some high level 
experts at the UN have even theorized that China and Russia allowed R2P to be used to call 
for the use of force in Libya with the express purpose and knowledge that overreach would 
cripple the doctrine in the future.92 However, analysis of the dialogue surrounding the 
adoption of Resolution 1973 seems to paint the opposite view, with China and Russia 
asking insightful yet unanswered questions, specifically aimed at clarifying the extent and 
                                                        
87 See Williams, supra note 75, at 291. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Arab Spring, Libyan Liberation and the Externally Imposed Democratic Revolution, 
89 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 731 (2012). 
91 See Bernstein, supra note 77, at 338; Bydoon, supra note 82, at 381; Williams, supra note 75, at 279-280. 
92 Personal knowledge gained from direct conversations on Syria with Deputy Permanent Representatives 
while working full time at the UN and EU headquarters in NYC during the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Aug. 
2012. Conversation arose in part from conversations on the politicking and threats exchanged between China, 
Russia, UK and the US on conditional support and threats of non-acceptance of the ATT.  
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methods of intervention.93 Conspiracy theories aside, given the long history of inaction by 
the international community in so many cases of horrific humanitarian crises, the question 
must be asked: why the use of R2P in Libya?  
Factors for use of R2P in Libya 
It is unlikely that any singular reason or concern brought about the use of R2P in 
Libya. On the contrary, an assortment of factors played a role. Some of these include the 
Arab Spring inspired revolutions, the degree of human suffering, the prolific use and 
availability of online news sources and information sharing, and the widespread and 
constant news coverage and media attention on Libya. Factors specifically related to the 
Libyan regime include the size of the army and the virtual lack of allied states. And finally, a 
large public will for action developed from UN inaction in the past, the possibility of 
damage to UN legitimacy, and the particular state interests of the intervening countries.94 
The sheer scale and speed with which revolutions blossomed across the Middle East 
galvanized the attention of the world. For the first time in modern history, large-scale 
multi-state revolutions were not only taking place, but were actually creating change in one 
of the most traditionally authoritarian regions of the world. Prior to the intervention, the 
price paid by civilian protesters against the established leadership in Libya was high. 
Violent government acts included mass killings, summary executions, the use of tanks, 
                                                        
93 See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg. at 8, 10, S/Pv.6498 (Mar. 17, 2011)(China and the Russian Federation 
asked questions on the specifics of the proposed no-fly zone, rules of engagement, and limits on the use of 
force, all of which were left unanswered by the other UNSC members. China also stressed the importance of 
the Arab League and African Union requests for intervention. The Russian Federation explicitly states 
concerns that the consequences of excessive use of force in Libya will harm the future ability to maintain 
peace and security throughout the Middle East.) 
94 Evidence of the public will can be seen by the creation of R2P itself.  
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attack helicopters, and the deaths of thousands of civilians.95 Large-scale involvement by 
Middle Eastern youth was another factor that heavily contributed towards the intensity of 
protests, and degree of attention and publicity gained by each protest or act of defiance.96 
Arab Spring protesters in every involved state turned to the Internet as a means of 
communication, whether used internally as a tool of organization and coordination, or 
externally as a means of spreading their story and garnering ever-greater domestic and 
international support.97 In fact, sites like Facebook and YouTube were oftentimes credited 
with having played key roles in the efforts of protesters.98  This massive stream of 
information aided the widespread news coverage of events, statements, and conditions 
surrounding events. Media coverage in turn added pressure on the UN and world leaders to 
act. The UN could not afford to allow the situation in Libya to remain unaddressed and risk 
the possibility of non-UNSC authorized, yet potentially successful, unilateral action.99 
However, once action was authorized, it was NATO forces, not the UN, that controlled the 
overall mission. 
Several factors also made Libya an easy target for international intervention. The 
Libyan army was only estimated to contain between 50,000 and 130,000 troops, with most 
                                                        
95 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navenethem Pillay, Report to United Nations Human Rights 
Council, 9 mins. (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/298207-1. 
96 Al-Momani, supra note 70, at 160-161 (Noting the combination of lack of employment plus high education 
and oppressive regimes led to a build up of tension and political anger); See also Filipe R. Campante & Davin 
Chor, Why was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring, 
26 J. ECON. PERSP. 167, 169, 175 (2012) (Data shows that education levels in Middle East has rapidly increased, 
while job opportunities have either remained the same or stagnated. Increased education that is not 
rewarded in employment leads to decreased personal costs to political protest. The combination of high 
education and low job prospects increases political activism, and this was exactly reflected in the Arab Spring 
states.). 
97 Al-Momani, supra note 70, at 163 (Citing explosive growth in Internet usage in the Middle East, 29.8% by 
2010, a growth rate of 1,825% from 2000. Also 27 million Facebook users, a medium that the government 
had a difficult time regulating, yet allowed protesters to share information widely and rapidly.). 
98 Id. 
99 See supra note 74, and accompanying text. 
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elite forces composed of either mercenary or loyal tribal relations.100 It is reported that 
Gaddafi purposely kept his military small to reduce the threat of a military coup.101 Also, 
the rebel Libyan National Army was able to seriously contend with Libyan forces in terms 
of numbers and basic weaponry. This was especially true after the imposition no-fly zones 
and arms embargos by UNSC Resolutions 1973 and 1970, which removed most 
technological leads that Libyan forced had once held.102 Also, at the time of the Arab Spring, 
Gaddafi had few international allies and little support, with whatever relations he once had 
with major powers like Russia evaporating when Russia voted in favor of Resolution 1970 
and did not act against the passage of Resolution 1973.103 
Individual governments and coalitions also felt pressure to act. Domestic pressure, 
especially in democratic states, can exert tremendous pressure upon elected leadership 
and sway their decision making process. This effect is due to so called two-level games.104 In 
international affairs, leaders (level 1) must always be concerned with international 
pressures.105 However, domestic constituencies (level 2) also exert pressure upon their 
leaders.106 This in turn influences the possible actions that leaders may pursue.107 Leaders 
                                                        
100 ARAM NERGUIZIAN & ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, INSTABILITY IN SYRIA: ASSESSING THE RISKS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION 
17 (Center for Strategic & International Studies 2011), available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/111213_SyriaMilitaryIntervention.pdf; Sylvia Poggioli, Gadhafi’s Military 
Muscle Concentrated in Elite Units, NPR, Mar. 10, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/10/134404618/gadhafis-military-muscle-concentrated-in-elite-units.  
101 Poggioli, supra note 100. 
102 How Syria and Libya Compare, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Apr. 28, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/28/syria-libya-how-they-compare. 
103 NERGUIZIAN, supra note 100, at 21 (Russia is estimated to have lost a minimum of $4 billion in lost arms 
trade deals with Libya after creation of a UN arms embargo via Resolution 1970). See also UN Sanctions on 
Libya to cost Russia US$4 Billion, RT, Feb. 27, 2011, http://rt.com/news/russia-arms-export-libya/.  
104 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427, 
433-435 (1988) (well regarded theory of international diplomacy). 
105 Id. at 431-432. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. (two level games analysis: pressure from L2  L1 constrains possibilities. This effect is not always a 
negative or restrictive effect. For example, during negotiations L1 members may place excuses for lack of 
action on the needs and desires of the L2 group, thereby gaining flexibility in how they negotiate with other 
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often submit to pressure from their constituents due to political considerations such as 
gains or consequences in subsequent elections.108 For example, domestic US opinion in 
2011 was arguably less inclined to risk American lives and treasure upon yet another 
foreign war. This likely impacted President Obama’s decision to not push for the US to take 
the primary lead in military actions in Libya.  As a result, the US took a supportive role and 
largely backed up more direct action by French and other NATO forces.109 Given the state of 
war weariness in America, President Obama may have done so in part to gain an anti-war 
image for the upcoming 2012 Presidential Elections, which he won.110 
Analysis of relevant political commentary lends weight to the argument that state 
interests were the major reason for intervention in Libya, although humanitarian concerns 
did play a minor role.111 In the commentary surrounding the adoption of Resolution 1973, 
out of all UNSC members, only France briefly referred to the concept of an international 
responsibility to act, while most other members only stressed the responsibility of the 
Libyan government to protect its own people.112 Additionally, US President Obama made 
no mention of R2P in his address to the nation to establish the rationale behind the 
intervention in Libya.113 Instead, he stated that the US has a responsibility to act to protect 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
L1 groups. This option is oftentimes unavailable to L1 members who maintain strict control of the general 
population, such as dictators or military leaders.) 
108 Id. at 432. 
109 See Steven Erlanger, Libya’s Dark Lesson for NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SR4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/sunday-review/what-libyas-lessons-mean-for-
nato.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.   
110 Dave Boyer, Obama Carries Anti-War Message to Rallies, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Sept. 2, 2012, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/2/obama-biden-cast-romney-warmonger/?page=all.  
111 See generally Mohamed, supra note 74 (general theme of US involvement more to do with state interests 
than humanitarian concerns or duties under R2P). 
112 See U.N. SCOR, supra note 93, at 3 (“Every hour that goes by increases the burden of responsibility on our 
shoulders.”). 
113 President’s Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya, 2011 Daily Comp. Pres. Docs., 2011 DCPD No. 
00206 (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100206/pdf/DCPD-
201100206.pdf.  
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its interests and values.114 Further comments about the need to measure interests against 
the needs to act add weight to the argument that although R2P was created to rise above 
national interests, the reality remains that individual members of the international 
community still require the addition of personal beneficial interests in order to act.115 
Producing 1.5 million barrels of oil per day, Libya’s rich oil production capabilities are one 
of many possible interests that major Western powers considered worth protecting or 
securing.116 Although disappointing, given the potential political and economic costs 
associated with war for purely humanitarian purposes, it is unlikely that in the near future, 
states will fully eliminate the calculus of interests and benefits from their decisions to 
intervene.117  
Factors for use of R2P in Syria 
Given the plethora of factors that existed in pushing the international community to 
implement R2P intervention methods in Libya, it is important to check and compare these 
factors to those that exist in Syria. If a substantial number of the factors remain the same, 
or are present to a stronger degree, then the reasoning as to why R2P has not been 
                                                        
114 Id. at 5. 
115 See Mohamed, supra note 74, at 331, 336; Williams, supra note 75, at 282 (citing studies that show that 
external military intervention is usually inspired by self-interest, and intervention only for humanitarian 
purposes is extremely rare). 
116 See GUARDIAN.CO.UK, supra note 102; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2009 (2009), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html (Libya ranks 10th in the world 
for proven crude oil reserves with 4.88 billion barrels). 
117 See Williams, supra note 75, at 285 (war is rarely politically efficient, and especially humanitarian warfare, 
where a state money and troops are being expended for little tangible benefit and rather just to protect 
‘others’ ‘over there.’). 
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implemented a second time must be questioned. 
 
 
 Given the speed and breadth of the reaction in Libya, it is hard to grasp how the 
same community remained divided and indecisive on Syria. It is important to first compare 
and contrast the origin and timeline of protests in both countries. Government violence 
against Arab Spring inspired protesters in Syria occurred approximately one month after 
the first instances of violence in Libya.118 Instances of violence increased rapidly as 
protests spread throughout Syria, extending as far as the capital in Damascus.119 Protests in 
Syria clearly followed the same Arab Spring inspired path and those in Libya. 
  Civilian deaths in Syria are currently many times higher than reports from Libya in 
the days prior to international action.120 Multiple reports place the current death toll in 
                                                        
118 Blight et al., supra note 67, at Syria Feb. & Mar. 2011 (Syrian government forces began killing protesters in 
mid-March 2011, compared to protests in Libya which began in mid-February 2011.). 
119 Id. at Syria Mar. 2011 (nine major protests within two weeks of the beginnings of violence in Syria). 
120 See Seumas Milne, If the Libyan War was About Saving Lives, it was a Catastrophic Failure, the Guardian, 
Oct. 26, 2011, at p. 33, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-
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Syria at approximately 60,000 or greater.121 Not all of these deaths constitute pure un-
armed civilians. However, peaceful unarmed protests in Syria lasted longer than those in 
Libya, with early reports showing deaths totaling 1,000 or more within the earliest 
months.122 As in Libya, Syrian youth played a key role in the beginning stages of protest and 
initiated strident calls for significant reform.123 Protesters also made liberal use of the 
Internet and social networking websites to help coordinate and spread their goals and 
messages.124 Unlike the situation in Libya however, Syrian officials reacted quickly; 
periodically shutting down Internet and phone line services to cities and towns across the 
state.125 Growing differences between Libya and Syria become more apparent when 
comparing the risks that any international intervention forces might face in Syria. 
 Unlike Libya, the balance of forces between the Syrian government and opposition 
forces is much less favorable for intervention forces. At the start of the conflict in Syria, the 
Syrian army was estimated to include over 400,000 troops, including armored units, 
Special Forces, enormous stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and a modern air 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
saving-lives-catastrophic-failure (stating UN data shows pre-intervention death toll was between 1,000-
2,000). 
121 See MEGAN PRICE ET AL., PRELIMINARY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTATION OF KILLINGS IN THE SYRIAN ARAB 
REPUBLIC 1 (The Benetech Human Rights Program 2013), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/PreliminaryStatAnalysisKillingsInSyria.pdf (“[T]he seven 
databases collected here identified 59,648 unique killings.”); See also Ashley Fantz, Syria Death Toll Probably 
at 70,000, U.N. Human Rights Official Says, CNN, Feb. 12, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/12/world/meast/syria-death-toll. 
122 Syria Death Toll ‘Surpasses 1,000’, AL JAZEERA, May 24, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/05/2011524182251952727.html.  
123 See Kelly McEvers, Revisiting the Spark that Kindled the Syrian Uprising, NPR, Mar. 16, 2012, 
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/16/148719850/revisiting-the-spark-that-kindled-the-syrian-uprising (the 
interrogation and beatings of several youth is credited as the origin of Arab Spring protests in Syria).  
124 See Annasofie Flamand & Hugh Macleod, Syria’s Protesters Turn to Facebook to Expose ‘Citizen Spies’, THE 
OBSERVER, Oct. 8, 2011, at 26, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/09/syria-informers-
protests-internet-facebook.  
125 Martin Chulov, Syria Shuts Off Internet Access Across the Country, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Nov. 29, 2012,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/29/syria-blocks-internet.  
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force.126 Bolstering these units is a large state security system, comprised of four largely 
autonomous secret police or intelligence agencies.127 Conversely, Syrian opposition forces 
are far less well armed and organized. Syrian military forces regularly repel almost all 
advances that opposition forces have made.128  
 Sectarian violence, the possible threat to Israel, Iranian involvement, and lack of 
cohesion within the UNSC are all factors that must be weighed by those who would 
intervene in Syria. Religious, ethnic, and tribal divides are stronger and more pronounced 
in Syria than in Libya.129 Combined with a population over three times as large as Libya, 
Syria faces a high possibility of severe post-intervention violence.130 In addition, existing 
social divisions have been purposely inflamed by the Assad regime since the beginning of 
serious fighting in Syria.131 A destabilized Syria could also pose a threat to Israeli peace and 
security, something that the US is loath to allow.132 Furthermore, Iran’s strong support of 
the Assad regime, and the potential threat of Iranian action are of serious concern.133 
Finally, any foreign intervention efforts must first be approved by the UNSC.134 While 
regional organizations call for international action in Syria, they are not as explicit as they 
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were in Libya.135 However, even if an explicit request was made to the UNSC, as was done 
prior to Resolution 1973, it is unlikely such a request would sway China and Russia again. 
If the UNSC could come to an agreement, any plan of action would need to satisfy Russian 
and Chinese interests.136 These factors show that any intervention efforts in Syria will face 
a much more dangerous situation, with wider repercussions, than those faced in Libya. 
 Some states may also have an interest in preventing action in Syria including the 
Russian Federation, China, and the US. As discussed earlier, Russia’s interests may best be 
served with being able to continue its large military sales contracts with Syria.137 China, 
too, has little reason to support the use of R2P in Syria, especially if doing so would support 
a policy of overthrowing authoritarian governments.138 Lastly, US interests may be served 
by not intervening in Syria for various reasons. First, it is unknown if a replacement of the 
Assad regime would be more or less favorable to US interests.139 Second, the conflict is 
currently a large economic and military drain on Assad’s allies Iran and Hezbollah, 
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traditional US enemies.140 Third, Russia and China stand to lose standing in the region the 
longer they continue to block efforts to intervene.141 The fact that the US could likely do 
more than it currently does to help civilians in Syria, points to the possible veracity of such 
claims. Ultimate US reactions to current claims of the use of chemical weapons by the Assad 
regime against Syrian civilians will uncover the truth of whether or not the US supports 
R2P, or whether state interests reign supreme.142 
 Pillar two of R2P states that the international community has a responsibility to 
provide assistance in cases such as Syria. Pillar three further states that with UNSC 
approval, coercive or even forceful means of intervention may be allowed. For over two 
years, indications of massive violence and civilian deaths in Syria have been laid out before 
the international community. The fact that it has still not intervened indicates that one of 
the main goals of R2P, non-interest based intervention, has failed to manifest.143 While the 
exact rationale for non-intervention remains unclear, what is clear is that the international 
community has once again failed to uphold its duties to protect lives. This failure could 
have negative consequences for the future of UN legitimacy, as well as the outlook for 
future international doctrines and solutions to persistent world problems.  
THE FUTURE OF THE UN AND R2P 
IMPACT ON THE UN 
                                                        
140 Id. 
141 Id.  
142 See Noah Shachtman & Spencer Ackerman, Syrian Blood Tests Positive for Sarin Gas, US Spies Say, WIRED, 
Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/sarin-tainted-blood/; Us has ‘Some Confidence’ 
Syria Used Chemical Weapons, BBC, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22297569. 
143 See supra notes 111-117, and accompanying text 
 29 
For international institutions such as the UN, the appearance and maintenance of 
legitimacy is crucial to its future standing and existence.144 By utilizing R2P in Libya, the UN 
fended off the possibility of unilateral action that could undermine its legitimacy. Instead, it 
is now in an equally undesirable position. For forceful intervention under pillar three of 
R2P, the UNSC must give expressed approval for member state action.145 However, in 
allowing NATO to lead and coordinate the action in Libya, the UNSC abrogated its 
responsibility to maintain control of the world’s first R2P authorized intervention. Once 
NATO had taken over operations, any intervention mission was arguably outside of UN 
control. This can be seen in the swift shift in purpose from humanitarian intervention to 
regime change.146 Regime change, no matter the reason, is incompatible with core tenets of 
the Charter. These UN tenets stress the importance of political independence, non-
interference, and sovereign equality.147 By appearing to pick and choose where and when 
to intervene, the UN has undermined its own legitimacy. 
R2P MOVING FORWARD 
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 Two main options exist which could allow R2P to continue serving the vital purpose 
for which it was created – a decisive tool to protect civilian lives. One possibility would be 
to lower the controls on the doctrine to bypass the currently requirement of UNSC approval 
for pillar three.148 The current rules of R2P show that in situations where the UNSC fails to 
act in a timely manner, the GA has an option to address the matter under the “Uniting for 
Peace” procedure.149 Although the primary body responsible for maintaining international 
peace and security, the UNSC is the only means of addressing such important issues.150 
However, the “Uniting for Peace” procedure has at least one major weakness: decisions 
reached under this procedure are non-binding, and considered recommendations only.151 
For R2P to be strengthened in a meaningful manner, with the ability to pass binding 
resolutions without the approval of the UNSC, the Charter would need to be modified. 
However, changes to the Charter require approval by the UNSC, and it is highly unlikely 
that the permanent members of the UNSC would allow such action to pass. If R2P cannot be 
expanded, perhaps it should be limited. 
 The lack of clear instruction as to the guidelines, limits, and execution of 
intervention leaves R2P open to overreach. As a young doctrine, ambiguous characteristics, 
expansive scopes, or exploitative use can severely damage R2P’s reputation and future 
viability.152 By setting explicit guidelines and limits to what can and cannot be done under 
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R2P, the UN can provide clarity to the doctrine and uniformity to its application. 
Unfortunately, this would curtail some of the more aspirational aspects of R2P, which was 
created to be a broad and powerful option in the fight against massive humanitarian crises. 
However, the question must be asked whether a weaker R2P, is still better than no R2P at 
all. Those familiar with the historical events that necessitated the creation of R2P would 
answer that question with a resounding, “yes!” 
CONCLUSION  
 By placing a duty on the international community to act, R2P was created to remove 
interest-based calculations from the decisions making process of states. The purpose of 
which was to increase international intervention in instances of extreme humanitarian 
crisis.  However, a lack of clarity and instruction as to its actual execution kept the use of 
R2P uncertain. When finally used to justify intervention in Libya, the subsequent overreach 
of its mandate perverted its real-world application from the noble ideals of its creation. No 
longer seen as imposing a duty on states to act, it has potentially become a tool to be used 
when convenient. This is seen in the lack of action in Syria, despite far worse conditions 
than those used to justify action in Libya. Questions remain as to whether the international 
community ever truly adopted the full and intended meaning of R2P, or if state interests 
continue to dominate over humanitarian concerns. . The failure of R2P also reflects upon 
the UN, and has dealt a blow to its legitimacy and future viability. The future of R2P and the 
legitimacy of the UN are currently uncertain. However, solutions and possibilities exist that 
may salvage the future of both, but only if the international community can once more 
come together for purpose of the greater good. 
